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Contested Landscapes: The Global Political Economy of Climate 
Smart Agriculture 
Introduction 
The intimate relationship between the climate system and the agrifood system is increasingly recognised in expert 
and policy circles. The impacts of climate change on food security combined with the influence of food and 
agriculture over our collective ability to dramatically lower greenhouse gas emissions have given rise to calls for 
‘climate smart agriculture’ (CSA). This emergent paradigm seeks to square the goals of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation with the need to increase productivity in the agricultural sector and reduce poverty and hunger in 
developing countries through the promise of a ‘triple-win solution’. The recent Conference of the Parties (CoP 
22) to the climate regime in Marrakech showcased the newfound profile of agriculture as a critical site for the 
adaptation to and mitigation of climate change (FAO, 2016), and was dubbed the ‘action for agriculture CoP’1, 
within which CSA programmes and practices were a key underlying policy. 
What is missing from accounts of the geophysical interdependencies and policy responses to date, 
however, is a fuller theoretical account of the forms of discursive, institutional and material power which are 
driving and shaping this agenda and drawing boundaries around the diagnosis of the drivers of climate 
(in)compatible development and the solutions that are therefore advanced as ‘climate smart’ agriculture. This 
analysis of attempts by policy-makers to manage the relationship between climate change and agriculture invites 
questions about whose interests are served by predominant framings, as well as how the debate is influenced by 
the prevailing food regime that operates globally at this historical conjuncture. It explores the exercise of power 
in determining which issues, actors and agendas are included in, as well as screened out of, policy and public 
debates and interventions under the guise of CSA through strategic discursive framings and attempts to assert 
institutional control over the development of CSA. This account reveals the processes of accommodation and 
legitimation at work, which seek to obscure the critique potentially posed by climate change of prevailing modes 
of organising food systems, while showing how business as usual modes of agrifood production and governance 
can be rendered compatible with addressing the threat of climate change. Consistent with a neo-Gramscian 
approach to understanding the operation of hegemony, we explain how this is achieved across mutually 
reinforcing discursive, institutional and material sites of power whereby powerful actors seek to frame, govern 
and align CSA with the overriding imperatives of the dominant global system of food and agriculture. 
Analysing key initiatives in the area of climate-smart agriculture and the politics which surround them, 
as well as highlighting areas of deliberate neglect, we firstly identify the dominant discourses shaping the debate 
through a discussion of discursive sites of power. Secondly, we map the emerging ‘regime complex’ of 
institutional power that operates at the interface of the climate and agrifood system. Thirdly, we connect this to 
forms of material power that derive from control over production, finance and technology in the neoliberal food 
regime by transnational capital in the form of large agribusiness. Taken together, identifying and accounting for 
these three forms of discursive, institutional and material power helps to explain how responses to date are shaped 
by - and further entrench - landscapes of power in the global system of food and agriculture. This has important 
                                                          
1 http://www.cta.int/en/article/2016-11-14/cop22-n-action-for-agriculture.html 
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implications for which solutions are promoted as part of CSA and which actors are likely to benefit from the flows 
of technology, finance and institutional support that are mobilised in the struggle to define a viable global agrifood 
system in a warming world. 
 
Background 
 
‘Between now and 2050, the world’s population will increase by one-third. Most of these additional 2 
billion people will live in developing countries. …agricultural production will have to increase by 60 
percent by 2050 to satisfy the expected demands for food and feed. Agriculture must therefore 
transform itself if it is to feed a growing global population and provide the basis for economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Climate change will make this task more difficult under a business-as-usual 
scenario, due to adverse impacts on agriculture, requiring spiralling adaptation and related costs’ (FAO 
2013: ix) 
 
Effectively managing the intertwined relationship between climate change and agriculture has  long  been 
recognised as key to solving some of the most pressing issues of the twenty-first century. CSA has emerged in 
recent years as the paradigm de jour for connecting agriculture and climate change, as well as a prescription for 
how to manage that relationship. It has received significant support from major institutional actors, in particular 
from UN institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Bank, the International 
Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD), as well as from agricultural research organisations such as the 
CGIAR consortium and private sector actors ranging from agrifood to fertiliser and biotechnology corporations. 
While there is a now a rich policy and grey literature that recognises the ways in which the worlds of 
climate and agriculture increasingly impact upon one another, critical academic scrutiny has lagged behind in 
engaging with the politics surrounding CSA. The majority of CSA literature is policy-oriented, articulated through 
a language of ‘toolkits’ and ‘pathways’, rather than engaging with issues of power, authority and equity.  
Moreover, there is an unusual degree of blurring in CSA debates between policy and academic literature; a large 
number of journal articles about CSA are authored by agricultural scientists working for the institutions which are 
most influential in driving the agenda. This issue is exacerbated by a significant degree of institutional integration 
between many of the principal actors involved in CSA, namely between UN institutions such as the FAO with 
agricultural research institution, and between those institutions and major corporations such  as  biotechnology 
and  fertiliser associations. Whilst there is an emergent literature which considers issues such as the institutional 
arrangements of initiatives such as the GACSA (Aubert et al. 2015), as well as  an engaged and critical grey 
literature on the role of fertilizer companies in promoting CSA (GRAIN, 2015), critical attention to the underlying 
politics and political economy of CSA is still lacking. This leaves us with a dearth of conceptual and political 
resources to make sense of and engage with this evolving and increasingly important agenda, and for asking 
questions about who it serves and how, and who and what gets left behind. 
Drawing on analysis of the discursive, institutional and material forms of power that are shaping this 
agenda, we show how a political economy analysis is essential to understand the issues of conflict and consensus- 
building surrounding CSA, revealing the trade-offs obscured by its ‘triple-win’ logic. Firstly, we introduce and 
contextualise CSA: the emergence and evolution of the concept, its drivers and trends. We note that it has not 
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emerged in a neutral political space, but rather operates on a terrain of existing institutions and actors with clearly 
defined interests, mandates and ideologies - all of which seek to make sense of, or adopt, CSA in ways which 
protect or further enhance their power and influence. Secondly, we explore the discursive politics of CSA by 
unpacking the ambiguous definition of CSA and contextualise it within a field of other similar, but different, 
discourses around sustainable intensification and agroecology. Thirdly, we explore the institutional politics 
surrounding CSA and propose a ‘regime complex’ which seeks to render visible the actors, interests, institutions 
and power relations that shape the agenda.  Mapping and analysing these institutional configurations allows us to 
pose questions about (i) whose agenda is represented by CSA (ii) who regulates the interface between climate 
change, food and agriculture (iii) what activities are validated as CSA, which are not and why. It becomes apparent 
that this is a political arena occupied by powerful actors where the issue of climate change – its profile and levels 
of financing - creates opportunities for existing actors to adjust their mandates to establish or further consolidate 
a role for themselves in this arena. Finally, we explore the material political economy of a dominant neoliberal 
food regime and its influence over the content of CSA evident in the structural power wielded by large 
agribusiness capital based on their control over production, finance and technology and the buy-in that public 
institutions seek from them. This helps to historicise the debate: its timing, form and framing in a context of a 
finance-led regime of accumulation and the global re-ordering of food and farming. We conclude by suggesting 
that, taken together, an account of these dimensions of power helps us to understand the processes of 
accommodation and legitimation at play to protect prevailing strategies of accumulation in the food and 
agriculture sector organised around industrial, high-input, export-oriented agriculture which is private-sector led, 
albeit with ample state and public institutional backing. 
In an empirical sense the analysis draws from and contributes to wider debates about the power of agri -
food corporations in the global economy (Clapp and Fuchs 2009) as well as work seeking to bring political 
economy perspectives to bear on other aspects of ‘climate-compatible development’ (Naess et al 2015). 
Theoretically, it draws upon and supports neo-Gramscian accounts of the reinforcing nature of material, 
institutional and discursive power in the production of hegemony in the agricultural sector and beyond (Levy and 
Newell 2002; Newell 2009; Schnurr 2013) as a useful way of understanding the efforts of incumbent actors to 
shore up their privileged position by accommodating critical challenges and de-legitimating alternative pathways. 
Methodologically, the research is underpinned by analysis of the emergent regime complex surrounding climate 
change, food and agriculture. These insights were enhanced by participant observation during the many side- 
events run by key actors in this debate at the 22nd UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Marrakech. 
 
The landscape of Climate Smart Agriculture: Drivers and Trends 
 
Agriculture is directly reliant on natural resources and the climate, consuming some 70% of global freshwater and 
occupying 40% of global land area (Braimoh, 2013). However, through increasingly industrialized production 
methods, it is now amongst the most significant contributors to climate change, accounting for 56% of global non-
CO2 GHG emissions through the production of methane and nitrous oxide, and between 19% and 29% of total 
GHG emissions (Vermeulen et al. 2012). Agriculture is also a major driver of deforestation, which accounts for 
an additional 17 % of global GHG emissions (Smith et al., 2007), through incursions for the grazing of cattle and 
the cultivation of animal foodstuffs such as soya. The contribution of the powerful meat and dairy industry in 
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particular has attracted attention and controversy given the land, energy and water inputs required to rear livestock, 
as well as the resultant methane emissions (Kirby 2011; Garnett 2009). Meanwhile, global infrastructures of 
storage and transportation for processing and shipping food around the world rely upon the availability of cheap 
and reliable fossil fuels and as a result generate large emissions of GHGs or ‘food miles’. From this to the role of 
retailers, packaging and consumers, there is a climate footprint throughout the supply chain (Oosterveer and 
Sonnenfeld 2012). Agriculture is also, however, one of the sectors most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
2.5 billion people globally depend upon agriculture for their livelihood (FAO, 2013b). This is 41% of the world’s 
population, and the figure rises in Sub-Saharan Africa, where on average, over 60% of the population works 
primarily in agriculture (FAO, 2012). Whilst it is recognized that subsistence farming in many rural contexts is 
increasingly supplemented with a range of off-farm incomes and coping strategies (Bryceson, 2002), especially 
in situations of climatic stress and variability (Mosberg and Erikson, 2015), the fact remains that the incomes of 
many poor households worldwide are intimately tied to agriculture through crops, livestock and forest resources. 
It is not hard to see why agriculture and food security are so vital to the prospects of development and poverty 
reduction in the context of climate change. 
 
2009 The term climate-smart agricultural development was first used in 2009 in FAO publication (Mann et 
al 2009). 
 The Global Research Alliance was launched, providing an organisation and framework for 
cooperation and investment in research to reduce agricultural greenhouse emissions. 
2010 The First Global Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change at the Hague defined 
CSA as actions which; “sustainably increases productivity, enhances resilience, reduces/removes 
greenhouse gas emissions, and enhances achievement of national food security and development 
goals”. 
 FAO 'The Mitigation of Climate Change in Agriculture’ (MICCA) programme launched. 
2011 The Johannesburg Communiqué – “Africa: A Call to Action: Johannesburg, South Africa: African 
Ministerial Conference on Climate Smart Agriculture - A common position by African Agricultural 
Ministers. 
 Global Science Conference on CSA: The Wageningen Statement identified scientific priorities to 
accelerate CSA. 
 CoP17 in Durban, South Africa. Parties asked the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) to explore the possibility of a formal work programme on agriculture. 
2012 The Second Global Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change - The Hanoi 
Communiqué. 
2013 FAO EPIC programme ‘Economics and Policy Innovations for Climate-Smart Agriculture’ launched. 
 Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA), launched at the UN Climate Summit, New 
York. 
2015 CoP21 CSA showcased at a variety of side-events and exhibitions. 
2016 CoP22 a series of CSA themed side-events, launch of CSA initiatives 4 par 1000, a French-led soil 
carbon sequestration project, joined by Moroccan-led AAA initiative, also focussed on CSA. 
 
Table 1 – A chronology of CSA. 
 
Despite recent heightened attention to CSA, attempts to better understand the climate change- agriculture nexus 
have been a feature of discussions for decades. The need for agriculture to adapt to climate change has been 
recognised since the very first IPCC assessment report (Tegart, 1990), and was also reflected in the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio. However, policy approaches which seek to manage the 
synergies between agriculture and climate change have been slower to develop.  Table 1 provides a brief 
chronology of the term CSA, which was first used in a 2009 FAO paper calling for greater efforts in mitigation 
5 
 
and adaptation (Mann et al., 2009). The concept has since gained significant traction and come to the forefront of 
policy debates, especially in the run up to the Paris CoP21. Indeed, the importance of agriculture to climate change 
negotiations was underscored by the INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) submitted prior to 
CoP21, in which over 85% of developing countries made reference to agriculture, forestry and land use in their 
mitigation contributions, and of the countries that specified adaptation commitments in their INDCs, more than 
90% referred to the agricultural sectors (FAO, 2016b). This provided the backdrop for the recent CoP22 in 
Marrakech, which placed an unprecedented emphasis on agriculture, and at which two additional ‘flagship’ CSA 
initiatives were launched: the 4 par 1000 soil carbon sequestration programme and the Moroccan-led AAA 
programme (Adaptation of African Agriculture). 
 
The discursive political economy of CSA 
 
According to the FAO, CSA integrates ‘three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and 
environmental) by jointly addressing food security and climate challenges’ (2013). The three main pillars of CSA 
are therefore i) to adapt and build resilience to climate change, ii) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and iii) to 
sustainably increase agricultural productivity and incomes - hence promising ‘triple-win’  outcomes (ibid). 
Examples of specific practices which are promoted under the premise of CSA include agro-weather tools to help 
farmers judge when to crop, site-specific nutrient management to tailor fertiliser use (Richards et al. 2015) and 
practices such as intercropping to maximise carbon sequestration (van Asten et al. 2015), which points to the 
potential for CSA to facilitate the further extension of emissions trading schemes to soil carbon sequestration. 
Given both the scope of the objectives and possible practices that CSA could entail, it is not described as one 
particular technique, but instead as a broader approach to reconciling climate change and agriculture (FAO, 2013). 
The three pillars of CSA are often described as a continuum, and any one CSA practice can emphasise different 
elements of the three pillars of CSA; adaptation, mitigation and increased production. 
Notably, many of the practices advocated by CSA initiatives are extremely similar to those implemented 
through other development programmes which seek to recognise the synergies between climate change and 
agriculture,  and the FAO clearly acknowledge that CSA is ‘not a new agricultural system’ (FAO, 2013: 27). 
Despite this, it is interesting that CSA is still framed as distinct from other approaches (Locatelli et al., 2015), 
described as a ‘broader platform’ and ‘a new approach… to guide the needed changes of agricultural systems’ 
(FAO, 2013:27). This distinction is further highlighted by IFAD, who describe how CSA is distinguishable from 
other policies based on its ability to ‘enable smallholder farmers to become significant beneficiaries of climate 
finance’ (Grainger-Jones, 2011). This contradiction indicates that whilst there are often no substantive differences 
between CSA and many pre-existing practices, it is seen as imperative to differentiate CSA for reasons of securing 
new and additional finance from climate funds. Hence there is a difficult balancing act to perform between framing 
the definition of CSA widely in order to enrol as many powerful actors as possible, while still differentiating the 
specific technologies and practices of CSA from other agricultural development policies when it comes to 
attracting new streams of finance. 
Engaging transnational agribusiness capital around CSA initiatives is of prima facie importance. Not 
only do headline CSA programmes such as the GACSA (Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture) and 
EPIC (Economics and Policy Innovations for Climate-Smart Agriculture) focus explicitly on engaging 
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commercial actors, but CSA is increasingly being mainstreamed into Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
discourses. For example, multinational companies such as McDonalds and Kelloggs have made commitments to 
‘climate smart’ approaches as part of the GACSA (CIDSE, 2015). Walmart, meanwhile has announced its own 
‘Climate  Smart Agriculture Platform’  in partnership with its suppliers and well-known food companies like 
General Mills and PepsiCo (FutureFood, 2015), promising to drive the ‘adoption of best practices in agriculture’ 
(Walmart, 2014). McDonalds, Kellogg Company and Walmart are also signatories to the Joint Statement for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition made at the 2014 UN Climate Summit . In terms of corporate-led actions, 
the World Business Council on Sustainable Development launched a Low Carbon Technology Partnerships 
initiative (LCTPi) within which Monsanto co-leads the 'Climate-Smart Agriculture' programme. However, the 
specific mechanisms and policies through which these CSA platforms will work remain unclear, and corporations 
are free to define 'climate smart' approaches according to their own CSR frameworks. 
Given the drive to enrol corporate actors in the CSA agenda, it is unsurprising that a powerful meta 
‘market liberal’ frame (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011) is adopted by the key proponents of CSA that serves to draw 
boundaries around what is at stake and what the menu of politically, technologically and economically feasible 
options are. The emphasis is on pricing, market-making, technology and protecting property rights in order to 
meet the twin challenges of climate change and food insecurity. A strong sub-narrative at play here is an 
overwhelming emphasis on private sector-led agricultural development evident in the collaborative, commercially 
engaged learning-platform approach of the flagship CSA initiative GACSA, which very much seeks to integrate 
corporate interests and investment. This is exemplified by the description of the GACSA offered by Dr Andrew 
Enow, the coordinator of the GACSA facilitation unit, in a forum about climate smart agriculture programmes; 
describing the alliance as ‘a voluntary, action-oriented, multi-stakeholder platform… creating an open, diverse 
and inclusive dialogue’2. In this narrative, the primary role of the development community therefore is to lever, 
and scale-up private finance with strong parallels with the The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
which ‘brings partners together to unlock responsible private investment in African agriculture’3. The persistent 
focus on leveraging finance alongside attempts to incorporate a wide spectrum of agricultural practices under the 
umbrella of CSA, without questioning the many ways in which the business as usual practices of these actors 
might be driving climate change, are indicative of the discursive power at play in attempts to draw boundaries 
around the meaning and direction of CSA. 
This discursive work of accommodation is also manifested through ambiguous definitions and blurring 
between CSA and pre-existing practices. Specifically, there have been calls to better differentiate between CSA 
and preexisting policies such as sustainable intensification, which are often bundled together in the policy 
literature. For example, during the most recent CoP22, a variety of side-events focussing on CSA referred to 
‘climate smart’ as a catch-all prefix for a variety of initiatives, referring to ‘climate smart soil management’ and 
‘climate smart farming’ across numerous contexts. In particular, many of the discussions of ‘climate-smart soil 
management’ and ‘climate smart farming’ at CoP22 blurred CSA with sustainable intensification, such as a World 
Farmer Organisation event focussing on the role of farmers in implementing the Paris Agreement, in collaboration 
                                                          
2International Agricultural Research Cooperation for Climate Change - Follow-up side event of G7 Niigata Agriculture 
Ministers’ Meeting https://ccafs.cgiar.org/cop22-side-event-international-agricultural-research-cooperation-climate-
change#.WDGpHOaLTb0 
3https://www.new-alliance.org/ 
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with the International Fertiliser Association and the GACSA,  during which the panellists argued for sustainably 
intensified agriculture through increased access to, and use of, fertilizers (IFA, 2016). This argument was premised 
around responsible fertiliser use, which was described as ‘climate smart integrated soil fertility management’.  
Whilst from a policymaking perspective, bundling together different approaches and concepts allows for 
broadening the appeal and relevance of CSA, it is problematic to blur the distinctions between such practices, 
especially in this context where the prefix of ‘climate- smart’ can reinvigorate an outmoded and contested 
approach such as ‘sustainable intensification’ which has been subject to wide-ranging critique (Garnett and 
Godfray 2012; FoEI 2012).  Beyond questions surrounding the distinctions between CSA and sustainable 
intensification, reflections upon whether and how the intensification of agricultural production or the increased 
role of private investment in agriculture have a part to play in accelerating climate change were missing from this 
debate. 
The ambiguity of CSA is particularly challenged by proponents of agroecology, who have vigorously 
sought to defend and distinguish agroecology from CSA, arguing that CSA is an offensive PR strategy designed 
to ‘to drown out rising support for agroecology’ (Lilliston, 2015). Similar to the case of sustainable intensification, 
at CoP22, CSA was frequently referred to in discussions of agroecology without clearly distinguishing what these 
approaches mean, blurring terms such as ‘climate smart food security’ and ‘climate smart agroecology’4, and a 
similar approach can be seen in CSA literature such as the Care and Foodtank (2015) report on agriculture and 
climate change. Proponents of agroecology are at pains to correct this discursive ambiguity, arguing that in 
contrast to CSA, agroecology is a set of time-tested agronomic approaches focussed on sustainable pathways in 
agriculture with a much greater focus on food justice and food sovereignty (Jahi Chappell, 2014). A jointly signed 
letter from attendees of the International Symposium on Agroecology for Food and Nutrition Security made it 
very clear that the emergent CSA paradigm should not be confused with agroecology, which the authors argue is 
better defined, less vague and therefore less subject to potential misinterpretations and abuses (Jahi Chappell and 
Majot, 2014). Similar to the case of sustainable intensification, blurring such definitions offers the potential for 
building consensus and re-invigorating pre-existing paradigms, though this response from the agroecology 
community underlines the significant concern about the appropriation of the term agroecology, which given the 
important and fundamentally distinct ideological tradition that it represents, would be especially problematic.  
 
The institutional political economy of CSA 
 
Beyond an account of the discursive manoeuvres described above, it is important to show how power relations 
manifest themselves in the particular institutional spaces between climate change and agriculture, asking questions 
of whose agendas are represented and advanced by CSA, who regulates the political arena in which these issues 
are addressed, and which activities are deemed to count as CSA (and which are not). In Figure 1 we provide a 
map of the regime complex: the institutions and initiatives which are most engaged in shaping and producing the 
CSA agenda. As we saw above, a range of public and private institutions including key actors in global governance 
– namely UN institutions such as the World Bank, the FAO and IFAD, as well as those in food and agricultural 
research including the CGIAR and its partnered research centres, are centrally involved. Also engaged across the 
                                                          
4http://www.fao.org/gacsa/events/details/en/c/449682/ 
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policy domains of climate change and agriculture, however, are individual treaty secretariats such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), because of the links to biodiversity and genetic resources, and other 
global economic actors such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the OECD, each seeking to assert 
their preferred understanding of CSA. Though it is the case that CSA is not novel in terms of the actual practices 
proposed, as noted above, the paradigm has given rise to new configurations of the food regime and of actors at 
the interface between climate change and agriculture, where institutional backing and legitimation is required to 
support and enhance the financialisation of food, agriculture and climate change. CSA therefore provides an 
opportunity to lend renewed political effort and financial resources to previous reforms; revitalizing pre-existing 
policies in the climate change, food and development arena; as the FAO state ‘CSA offers an opportunity to 
revitalize … efforts, overcome adoption barriers, while also adjusting them to the new realities of climate change’ 
(FAO 2013: xi). While this refers to initiatives to advance ‘sustainable’ agriculture, it is also used strategically to 
endorse and advance efforts to advance a market liberal model in the agricultural sector consistent with the global 
neo -liberal food regime prevailing since the 1980s (McMicheal 2016), as we demonstrate later in relation to 
efforts to access carbon market finance and re-package technologies and practices favoured by agribusiness as 
CSA. 
 
The regime complex of CSA 
 
By way of understanding the power dynamics between institutions active in the CSA arena here we develop an 
analysis of a regime complex around CSA. ‘Regime complexes’ refer to loosely coupled sets of regimes which 
allow for the tracing of the relationships and dynamics between actors within the complex. Analyses of such 
complexes have been produced for genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor, 2004), food security (Margulis 2013) 
and climate change (Keohane and Victor, 2011), but not yet for the complex which covers climate change, food 
and agriculture. Whilst the CSA regime operates through a number of the same actors and institutions found in 
the climate change regime complex, it is distinct in that by focussing on the specific policy of CSA, rather than a 
broader issue such as climate change, the CSA regime more obviously accommodates both proponents and critics. 
For example, it includes a number of NGOs, civil society and farmer organisations critical of the approach, albeit 
wielding uneven power over the key fora through which CSA is being promoted, which is critical to the ability of 
the complex to accommodate criticism and bolster its legitimacy. This occurs through seeking consensus and 
stability for the sorts of dominant framings noted above and the material interests they serve through discursive 
reinforcement and institutional enmeshment with key neo-liberal institutions such as the World Bank and OECD 
and an array of corporate actors, while allowing for spaces of dissent through weaker and less powerful but more 
farmer-oriented institutions such as IFAD and other organisations in which civil society actors are better 
represented. 
The first key observation from the CSA regime complex is the extent to which UN institutions are active 
drivers, financially and conceptually, across a diversity of initiatives and programmes. For example, at the heart 
of the regime complex in Figure 1 are three FAO initiatives which are central to advancing CSA. Most notably 
this includes the GACSA, which provides a broad platform for CSA initiatives and is the highest profile of these 
programmes, as well as MICCA (Mitigation of Climate Change in Agriculture), which focuses on mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change through agriculture, and the EPIC programme, which seeks to maximise climate 
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finance and policy innovations for CSA. More recently, the 4 par 1000 soil carbon sequestration programme led 
by the French agricultural ministry, and the Moroccan-led AAA programme may also make an impact, though 
these programmes are still in the early stages of development and are yet to be operational. CSA has also received 
significant exposure through UNFCCC CoP events, in particular at the most recent CoP22 in Marrakech, as well 
as major conferences on agriculture and food security, such as the Global Conference on Agriculture, Food 
Security and Climate Change, which is sponsored by the FAO, and the International Symposium on Agroecology 
which is also organised by the FAO. Moreover, many of the principal agricultural research organisations involved 
in CSA, most notably the CGIAR and its numerous partnered research centres, receive a large share of their 
funding through UN institutions, whilst the central CGIAR Fund is administered by the World Bank. Notably, the 
CGIAR Fund has recently seen a downturn in funding and the World Bank has decreased their contributions from 
$50 million in 2014 to $30 million in 2015 as part of wider budget cuts (Arkin, 2016). This may diminish the 
future significance of the UN institutions in terms of their funding to the CGIAR, yet it does underscore the desire 
for institutions such as the CGIAR to push for a key role advancing a paradigm like CSA which presents 
significant opportunities to increase profile and attract finance for their work. Finally, it is clear that there is also 
a lot of interest from the World Bank in CSA opportunities for climate finance and emissions trading mechanisms, 
especially through no-till agriculture and bio-char; a point we return to below.  
Secondly, it is important to note how actors and bodies within the regime complex interact and intersect. 
There is a particularly close relationship between research organisations and universities in the agricultural sector, 
as well as a close connection between these groups and biotechnology and agricultural research with the private 
sector. For example, CIRAD, which is a notable agricultural research organisation, is embedded within Agropolis 
International, a research consortium based in Montpellier, France, which has a number of University members as 
well as biotech research organisations. The degree of overlap between private sector agricultural corporations 
such as fertiliser groups, biotech and research organisations are also a significant feature. For example, the CGIAR 
CCAFS research programme is partnered with Monsanto, the International Plan Nutrition Institute (a fertiliser 
lobby group), NGOs partnered with fertiliser companies such as EcoAgriculture, as well as a large number of 
universities.5  These examples show the partnerships, collaborations and interactions between such organisations 
are critical to understanding this regime complex, which is very much characterised by institutional embedding 
and a system of revolving doors. 
To further exemplify some of these features it is instructive to look to the GACSA as a flagship CSA 
initiative. The core of support is derived from a variety of UN institutions; the World Bank, FAO, UNDP, 
UNFCCC and IFAD, as well as the CGIAR. In terms of membership, the February 2016 GACSA signatories 
includes a variety of actors, ranging from states to NGOs, universities, the private sector and a small number of 
farmer's groups6. However, the membership structure also shows how a number of actors involved in the initiative 
are significantly over- represented. For example, the FAO, which founded the GACSA, is independently a 
signatory alongside the World Bank, IFAD and the World Food Programme. A similar story is evident with the 
CGIAR, which is independently a signatory as well as several of their consortium research centres such as the 
ICRAF, IRRI, CIFOR and CIRAT, not to mention other agricultural research organisations which have 
partnerships with, or are funded by, the CGIAR such as CIRAD.  This issue has also been highlighted by previous 
                                                          
5 https://ccafs.cgiar.org/partners 
6 http://www.fao.org/gacsa/members/members-list/en/ 
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analyses of the GACSA, which found fertiliser companies to be over-represented through their membership of 
numerous representative bodies and industry umbrella organisations who are all separate signatories (CIDSE, 
2015). The interconnections between private corporations, biotech and research organisations described above are 
also reproduced through the GACSA, whose members include fertiliser companies such as Yara – who have been 
particularly influential in the evolution and emergence of the CSA paradigm, having been heavily involved in 
early conferences through which CSA was conceptualized (GRAIN, 2015), Mosaic and Haifa Chemicals Ltd. 
These companies are joined by a number of fertiliser lobby groups such as Fertilisers Europe and the Fertiliser 
Institute, as well as NGOs partnered with fertiliser companies such as Agriculture for Impact (GRAIN, 2015).  
The GACSA has been criticized for a lack of oversight, transparency and accountability usually expected 
of UN intuitions (Aubert et al., 2015), and whilst some of these issues could be accounted for by the self-described 
‘light touch’ governance structure of the GACSA,7 this structure remains instructive for understanding who is 
represented, and who is over-represented in the GACSA - and helps to explain why more critical readings of the 
drivers of climate (in) compatible development are given short shrift. The conspicuous absence of Monsanto from 
GACSA membership is particularly noteworthy, explainable perhaps by the unwanted attention the antihero of 
agriculture might attract, plus the fact Monsanto have been able to lever influence over the CSA agenda through 
other means: co-leading a project for the WBCSD, not to mention their partnership with agricultural research 
bodies such as the CGIAR. 
It is also notable, nevertheless, that on the periphery of the CSA regime complex there are emergent 
collaborations of groups which oppose and challenge dominant framings of CSA. For example, the civil society 
group ‘Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns’ came together in late 2014 to reject the premise of CSA as a form 
of corporate greenwashing, and includes La Vía Campesina, Greenpeace and ActionAid International as well as 
a number of farmer organisations and human rights organisations (Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns, 2015). 
Other organisations to raise concerns about the genetic engineering and biotechnology facets of CSA practice 
include CIDSE, an alliance of Catholic development agencies as well as Caritas International, a Catholic 
development NGO. Meanwhile, the ETC Group and Heinrich Böll Stiftung have sought to challenge how, as they 
put it, CSA seeks to ‘outsmart nature’ and in the run up to the Paris CoP21 called on governments to reject CSA 
in favour of more farmer-oriented agroecology practices (ETC Group and Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2015). Not all 
NGOs contest CSA, however, and more conservative groups such as CARE, FoodTank and Humana are all 
broadly supportive of CSA. Moreover, it is interesting to note that emergent CSA initiatives such as 4 par 1000 
also seek to distinguish themselves from programmes such as GACSA, which is described as ‘more oriented 
toward industry and includes biotechnology as one approach…’ (Ministère  de L’agriculture,  2016). This 
heterogeneity amongst civil society organisations and NGOs is perhaps unsurprising, given the complexity of the 
climate change and agriculture issue, and as argued by Tramel (2016), whilst climate change has activated an 
exceptional space for countermovement building, divisions between and within organisations along lines of class, 
race and gender are inevitable given the complexity of the issues at the heart of the debate.   Thus, while there is 
contestation of dominant framings of CSA by an emergent alliance of civil society groups and NGOs, it is likely 
that with continued proliferation of CSA initiatives, the landscape is likely to become more complex and 
                                                          
7 International Agricultural Research Cooperation for Climate Change - Follow-up side event of G7 Niigata Agriculture 
Ministers’ Marrakesh CoP 2016.   
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fragmented, and it is possible that these civil society groups may also fragment in response to the new agendas. 
Nonetheless, as it stands, key agribusiness actors are significantly over-represented and dominant in the CSA 
regime complex as are public global governance institutions with a strong commitment to the prevailing food 
regime organised as it is along neo-liberal lines. 
 
The Material Political Economy of CSA 
 
Besides documenting the forms of discursive and institutional power that work to frame and govern CSA in 
particular ways, a global political economy analysis also needs to understand the broader material dimensions of 
power exercised by dominant agribusiness actors that derive from their control over production, finance and 
technology in the current food regime (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). This strengthens an account of the emergence, 
development and implications of dominant framings of CSA by showing how these actors use CSA to advance 
their preferred technologies and strategies as well as seek to re-package them in ways which access new financial 
and revenue streams associated with carbon markets and the ‘bio’ or ‘green economy’. This ‘solutions’ and 
‘action-oriented’ oriented narrative offers little space for reflection on the ‘problems’ associated with the existing 
organisation of systems of food and agriculture in relation to their role in exacerbating climate change. 
What is significant here is how the dominant neo-liberal food regime that has taken hold since the 1980s 
shapes the contours of the debate about the CSA regarding appropriate interventions, actors and technologies. The 
idea of a food regime locates the production and consumption of food within broader historical cycles in the 
organisation of the global capitalist economy (McMicheal 2009). This helps to situate initiatives around CSA in 
relation to trends towards the financialisation of the food system apparent in new suites of products and services 
and the use of private capital for large land acquisitions (Fairhead et al. 2012). It enables us to understand attempts 
to use CSA as a vehicle for reconciling global neo-liberal models of agricultural production and consumption and 
the imperative to identify new sites of accumulation with the potential barriers to accumulation posed by climate 
change – affecting productivity, market access and availability of inputs and presenting a more generic crisis of 
legitimation for business as usual global food systems. In this sense, while sympathetic to Bernstein’s (2016) 
claim that agriculture has fully absorbed into circuits of capital, the approach developed here underscores 
Friedman’s argument that ‘food regimes and agrarian changes must be located in a wider set of analyses of 
agrarian and capitalist transitions’ (2016: 671) and, we would add, the contradictions associated with them. In 
particular in this case, the way in which accumulation strategies based on the intensive use of fossil fuels 
(including substantially from agriculture) are systematically undermining the conditions of reproduction in 
relation to food and farming because of the impacts of climate change. 
One of the most significant strategies by which this private-sector led transformation of the agricultural 
sector is expected to occur is by engaging finance capital. Political economists, drawing on Regulation theory that 
also informs many accounts of food regimes, refer to the particular power of finance capital in the post-Fordist 
global political economy as a finance-led regime of accumulation. The concept of regime of accumulation refers 
to the way in which production, circulation, consumption and distribution organize and expand capital in a way 
that stabilizes the economy over time. The modes of regulation required to stabilise these regimes include the law, 
state policy, corporate governance and cultures of consumption (Aglietta 2000). In the world of both climate and 
agriculture it manifests itself not only in the agency of financial actors in shaping preferred responses to these 
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issues, but in the creation of new suites of financial products to manage the risks brought about by both the 
financial turbulence and climate impacts of a global political economy in which they are hegemonic actors and 
primary beneficiaries. Examples include the creation of new asset classes such as weather derivatives, catastrophe 
bonds sold to other businesses vulnerable to extreme weather events associated with climate change and the selling 
of crop insurance to poorer farmers against crop failure as a result of climate change (Isaksen 2015). In relation 
to CSA, the Climate Bond Initiative's Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Technical Working 
Group have recently released their proposed eligibility criteria for AFOLU projects that qualify under the 'Climate 
Bonds Standard', with the aim of inviting 'climate friendly' investment in agriculture (Paul 2015). 
Whilst for these financial actors, shifts in the food regime promoted by the need to address climate change 
create potential opportunities, for agribusiness producers they can present real threats. We see this clearly in 
relation to the role of the fertilizer industries, for example, that mobilized in response to the conclusion of the 
2008 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
that the use of chemical fertilisers could be dramatically reduced without comprising crop yields. According to 
GRAIN, faced with this potential challenge to their business model, ‘the fertiliser companies have moved 
aggressively to control the international debate on agriculture and climate change, and to position themselves as 
a necessary part of the solution’ (2015:3). Materially there is a great deal at stake for the sector. Nitrogen fertilisers 
require an enormous amount of energy to produce; fertiliser production accounts for 1-2% of total global energy 
consumption and produces about the same share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Proactive 
engagement with CSA has to be understood then as attempt to anticipate and pre-empt the regulation of the 
production and use of nitrogen fertilizers as well as concern about the sector’s vulnerability to climate regulation 
of fossil fuels given their reliance on natural gas reserves and the extent of the chemical fertilizer industry’s 
undeclared scope 3 (indirect) emissions that it is keen to see escape regulatory attention. More proactively, CSA 
projects have also leant a convenient cover for attempts at introducing controversial technologies into new markets 
or gaining access to growing markets for their products. An example of the former would be the ‘climate smart’ 
projects such as Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA), seen by critics as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to establish 
smallholder dependence on Monsanto’s specially developed proprietary hybrid seeds (Schnurr 2015) . Regarding 
the latter it is perhaps no coincidence that  Norwegian fertilizer company, Yara International is trialling 
‘sustainable intensification’ in Tanzania under the umbrella of CSA when it is recalled that Africa has the world’s 
fastest growing market for fertilizers and Tanzania and Mozambique could hold important new source of natural 
gas reserves for fertilizer production (AFSA & GRAIN 2015). 
 
Old wine in new bottles? CSA, Climate markets and GM crops. 
 
Land management strategies consistent with this finance-led model of agricultural development are presented as 
a climate ‘fix’. During the negotiations towards the Paris CoP21 agreement, proposals were made to include 
agriculture in carbon trading mechanisms, particularly soil carbon sequestration, which, according to some 
estimates has the potential to offset some 5-15% of global fossil-fuel emissions (Paul et al 2009). There has been 
extensive lobbying from the World Bank about expanding carbon markets in this way, preparing the ground for 
market -based CSA interventions through pilot schemes, reports and capacity building through initiatives such as 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) and the Biocarbon Fund. The 
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push to link climate and agriculture has the backing of the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, whose 
members include many of the actors we have already described as active in this arena - government departments 
from the UK, Germany, Italy, France, the European Commission and the US, plus the World Bank and other 
development banks, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, The World Food Programme, The International Food Policy Research Institute and the Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in Africa. 
The FAO, in particular, eyes market access opportunities in CSA, noting ‘agriculture-related emission 
reductions from developing countries' as a chance to ‘provide important investments to spur rural development 
and sustainable agriculture in developing countries. Product standards and labels could be developed to certify 
the mitigation impact of agricultural goods’ (FAO 2013). By these means CSA interventions offer the means to 
reassure consumers about the climate impact of products they are buying through voluntary and private regulation 
as befits a CSR approach. Indeed, the GACSA seeks to provide a ‘learning platform’ in order to bring together 
diverse  organisations  modelled  on  other  multi-stakeholder   initiatives and   ‘roundtables’   on  ‘responsible 
production’ which are flourishing in key agricultural sectors that contribute significantly to climate change such 
as soy (where deforestation is a key issue), beef (where emissions from livestock are a concern), palm oil and 
biofuels (where deforestation, biodiversity loss and dispossession are also problematic). These practices form part 
of a long history of attempts by business actors keen to accommodate social and environmental critiques of their 
conduct through the development of private regulation (Jansen and Vellema 2004). 
In terms of creating demand for new ‘climate-friendly’ projects, the International Food Policy Research 
Institute and FAO have focused on soil carbon in particular. IFPRI’s Assistant Director General Alexander Müller 
has argued for an inclusion of soil carbon sequestration in carbon markets to ‘provide strong incentives for public 
and private carbon funds in developed countries to buy agriculture-related emission reductions from developing 
countries [...]’(FAO, 2009). Indeed, there are already several agricultural methodologies approved under the 
UNFCCC by the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) Executive Board, and many projects exist, particularly 
in relation to pig farms and oil palm plantations. These are contested for many reasons such as biodiversity 
destruction and soil and water pollution, as are CDM methodologies for agrofuels and for charcoal from industrial 
tree plantations. Through these means large  agribusiness strategies such  as  industrial  livestock production, a 
major emitter of greenhouse gases (mainly nitrous oxide and methane), are repositioned as a worthy recipient of 
climate finance. 
Significant effort has also been vested in trying to get financial support and UN carbon market backing 
for no-till agriculture (or ‘conservation tillage’ as companies tend to refer to it), which aims to reduce carbon 
emissions from the soil by not tilling the soil, a practice commonly used for cultivating GMOs in countries like 
Argentina. This is in spite of evidence of the long and widespread use of the practice, raising questions about the 
methodologies proposed and about their ‘additionality’ (i.e that they bring about emissions savings which would 
not have resulted anyhow) which is a key requirement for securing funding through the CDM (Newell 2009). 
Similarly, biochar is proposed as a new form of soil carbon sequestration in which fine-grained charcoal is applied 
to the soil. The International Biochar Initiative (IBI) argues, for example, that applying charcoal to soils would 
create a reliable and virtually permanent carbon sink, mitigate climate change, and make soils more fertile. Once 
again, clever boundary drawing exercises sustain these claims about the ‘climate-smart’ benefits of these 
interventions (Fairhead et al 2016). The burning of biomass to produce charcoal is described as close to carbon 
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neutral because greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions during combustion are supposedly offset by CO2 absorption 
during new growth. But this ignores the impacts of conversion or degradation of the large areas of land needed to 
produce the quantities of biochar proposed by many advocates. It is also unclear what percentage of black carbon 
will remain in the soil, for how long, and how much will be turned into CO2 and emitted again. Despite these 
uncertainties, biochar has been proposed among others by the UNCCD, by a number of African countries and 
Belize, Costa Rica, Micronesia, and soil carbon sequestration is also central to new initiatives such as the 4 par 
1000 programme, which seeks to increase the soil carbon store by 0.04% per year, in so doing offsetting increasing 
atmospheric CO2 (4 par 1000, 2016). 
The role of GM agriculture in CSA has been a further terrain of contestation. Hundreds of patent 
applications have been made for so-called ‘climate ready’ GM crops by leading biotech firms. This includes 
extending the geographic and climatic range of crops and their capacity to tolerate salt, drought, heat and floods, 
as well as engineering plants so that applications of nitrogen fertilizer can be reduced.  CSA provides an 
opportunity to finance and advance controversial interventions such as GMOs and GM trees. The urgency of the 
climate challenge, combined with recurrent Malthusian discourses around a growing population, falling yields 
and lack of fertile land are invoked to push transgenics, and strengthen calls for increased research into and social 
acceptance of GM crops. A CGIAR and CCAFS briefing warns, for example: ‘if farmers are to use more climate- 
friendly alternatives, such as nitrogen-fixing crops, then the pace of research to ensure the viability of these 
adaptation approaches  needs to quicken’ and ‘As the kinds and incidences  of plant diseases grow, research to 
develop disease-resistant  crop varieties will become increasingly important’ (Thornton 2012:7). Thus, for Paul 
et al (2009:6) ‘The biotech industry clearly sees climate change as an unlimited opportunity for expansion and is 
lobbying for GM to be recognised as offering key solutions...' 
The push to finance technologies and projects of benefit to agribusiness interests is clearly also part of 
the broader politics of climate change around displacement of responsibility and the search for ‘cost -effective’ 
market-solutions to climate change in the form of ‘climate capitalism’: the attempt to reconcile the need to de- 
carbonise the global economy with the continual imperative to locate new sites of accumulation for growth 
(Newell and Paterson 2010). As critics put it: ‘What really links REDD, LULUCF and agriculture is the push to 
extend carbon markets and let big polluters continue polluting’ (Paul, 2012:3) whereby ‘Climate-smart agriculture 
is aimed at regenerating the flagging carbon markets, with agriculture to be treated as a vast new sink for industrial 
emissions’ (ibid: 5). What is interesting, therefore, is the way in which the reaction to the threat posed by climate 
change to the agricultural system is a re-assertion and acceleration of neo-liberal solutions: that the challenge 
climate change poses to agricultural and food systems is actually a function of a finance and investment gap; and 
the need for technology-driven CSA for which neo-liberal actors are ideally placed to provide solutions. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
‘We risk paradigm maintenance. Current proposals for responses to climate change seek to maintain 
current power structures and basically amount to business as usual or worse’ (Paul et al 2009:42). 
 
We have argued in this paper that providing a global political economy account of power as manifested at the 
interface of climate change and food governance is key to understanding why CSA takes the form it does and who 
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is served by it. It enables us to understand the actors driving the initiatives and their privileged role in defining 
solutions. While these manifestations of discursive, institutional and material power take distinct forms, they also 
reinforce and rely upon one another such that the level of institutional access that leading agribusiness firms secure 
in global policy fora on CSA is a function of their control over production in supply chains as well as over finance 
and technology in the global food system, and the fact that attempts to render the food system 'climate smart’ will 
require their cooperation and support. The power and reach and ‘common sense’ character of the discourses of 
'triple-win' solutions for all are also a function of the privileged institutional spaces that key actors such as the 
FAO and the World Bank are able to occupy, the material resources they have to disseminate and reinforce 
preferred understandings of CSA through publications and toolkits, and their attendance at and sponsorship of all 
the key events where these issues are discussed. It is the mutually-enforcing nature of these expressions of 
material, institutional and discursive power then that allows incumbent actors in the current food regime to protect 
their hegemonic control and to accommodate threats to their legitimacy. We also noted competition between the 
different actors in the regime complex as they seek to pursue advantages for their own institutions by levering the 
high-profile attention that the relationship between climate change and agriculture is attracting, such that actors 
like the CGIAR seek to the remedy their recent funding decreases through involvement in high-profile initiatives 
around CSA. 
Whilst there is a strong case for thinking more systematically about the relationship between climate 
change and the organisation of global systems of food and agriculture and for constructing global and national 
institutional mechanisms and processes for addressing this in inclusive and equitable ways, the current framing of 
CSA is unlikely to achieve these ends. Rather than embracing an opportunity to reflect upon and address the 
contribution of agricultural models organised along industrial, high-energy and chemical input, and export-led 
lines, the advent of CSA has been used to exploit opportunities to consolidate and advance the control of private 
actors over land, technology and livelihoods in ways that are inimical to addressing either rural poverty or 
sustainability. This has occurred  by  advancing  controversial technologies  (such  as  GMOs  and  biofuels), 
promoting agricultural techniques  and  practices  whose  social  and  environmental benefits  are  still  poorly 
understood (such as biochar and no-till agriculture), and by seeking to finance CSA through new forms of ‘green 
economy’ financing and global carbon markets whose dubious environmental benefits and negative social impacts 
have been widely documented (Stephan and Lane 2015). 
Attention to the structural and systemic drivers of crises around climate change and food insecurity is 
thereby distracted by emphasis on incremental technological, economic and behavioural change, fetishizing 
individual acts of consumption (through standards and CSR best practice) and realignments in pricing, technology 
and property regimes (as promoted by actors such as the FAO and World Bank). What these initiatives and 
collaborations reveal is the significant investment in asserting the capacity of these actors and institutions to 
successfully manage the tensions and contradictions flowing from the challenge climate change poses to business 
as usual politics and practice in the agricultural sector and to translate contentious politics into manageable 
technocratic responses. Discursively they can be traced in acts of de-politicisation and attempts to obscure trade-
offs through 'triple-win' initiatives, efforts to accommodate and diffuse political threats to fossil fuel intensive 
technology- driven export-led food systems upon which the current food regime is organised and moves by 
agencies to bolster their own bureaucratic positions by securing access to large amounts of climate finance being 
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directed to climate adaptation and CSA. As over 350 civil society organisations declared in a statement from 
September 2015 criticising GACSA: 
 
"Agribusiness corporations that promote synthetic fertilisers, industrial meat production and large -   
scale industrial agriculture - all of which are widely recognised as contributing to climate change and 
undermining the resilience of farming systems - can and do call themselves 'Climate Smart'” (Climate 
Smart Agriculture Concerns 2015). 
 
Solutions proposed under the umbrella of CSA reward and thus consolidate the power of large agribusiness 
corporations and finance capital. The effect of discursive privileging and institutional support for only those 
solutions consistent with the existing distribution of power, finance and technology in global food systems is to 
delegitimise, and in some cases, appropriate, alternative solutions which might make an important contribution to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as enhance the productivity of the majority of the world’s 
smallholder farmers. A range of solutions have long been advocated, for example by the world’s largest 
organisation of smallholder farmers, Vía Campesina, who have attempted to  demonstrate the  benefits of 
agroecological small-scale sustainable farming. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food put it in 
calling for a greater diversity of approaches to food security and climate change: 
 
“The current input-intensive agricultural system is struggling under the combined pressures of climate 
change and food insecurity, exacerbated by large-scale agrofuel production and increased speculation on 
land. This type of agriculture depends heavily on fossil fuels that generate excessive greenhouse gas 
emissions. It also leads to the expulsion of rural populations and to inefficient and wasteful food chains… 
Policy makers have other choices.”  (2009). 
 
At the broadest level we showed how the drive to align responses to climate change under the prevailing food 
regime that has been predominant since the 1980s, organised around private-led transnational production networks 
and value-chains vertically integrating a diverse set of producers and retailers from ‘farm gate to dinner plate’, in 
ways which consolidate the power of a handful of leading agribusiness actors, helps to explain the form of 
responses to CSA to date. We unpacked the ambiguous definitions and approaches to CSA an d traced a regime 
complex which demonstrated the interests of UN institutions, in particular the FAO and World Bank, along with 
the private sector and agricultural research and biotechnology institutions in propagating a version of CSA that 
aligns with their political worldview and material interests. The degree of support given to this project by this 
range of powerful international institutions acting in mutually reinforcing ways shows that the material power of 
agrifood corporations is enhanced by the backing, financial support and legitimation leant by these institutions 
and the uptake and reinforcement of key messages around the ‘triple-win’ nature of CSA for farmers. The de-
legitimation of alternatives is combined with the repetition of narratives that population increases together with 
declining yields and lack of available land means that practices such as CSA are framed as the only viable way 
forward. The effect is to elude questions about which farmers and whose environment will be protected by CSA 
and how, while privileging carbon fetishism and reducing the climate-agriculture interface to commensurate 
fungible units - the ‘carbon cash crop’ model. 
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Thus, an emphasis on emissions trading has displaced a focus on emissions reduction; an emphasis on 
control through technology has predominated over access to technology and radical innovation; consolidation of 
land rather than redistribution; and reinforcement of property rights rather than sharing of technologies central to 
climate resilient agricultural practices. CSA has become a site for the attempted resolution of the need for finance 
to find something to invest in, extending their control over land; for governments and neo-liberal global 
institutions to shore up flagging carbon markets by expanding into agriculture; for biotechnology firms to re- 
invent GMOs as ‘climate-smart’ and for global agricultural institutions to raise their profile and diversify their 
funding streams by taking on mandates for tackling and responding to climate change. The unfortunate and 
inevitable effect of this confluence of agendas is to ensure that other accounts of how to respond effectively to the 
crises  facing  food,  farming  and  the  environment are  side-lined  and  ignored.  Therefore, our account has 
demonstrated that CSA, which is by its own account not a novel approach, currently serves to strengthen and 
reinvigorate the status quo of the post-1980s neoliberal food regime. The battle to create food systems that are 
just and compatible with a climate system that is stable and inhabitable by humans is far from over. Contestations 
over CSA are merely the latest skirmish in this conflict. 
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Appendix 
Glossary of terms 
 
 
*Figure 1 attached. 
  Figure 1 caption – A regime complex of actors in the climate smart arena. 
 
 
AAA Adaptation of African Agriculture initiative. 
CGIAR Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centres' 
CCAFS (CGIAR Research Program) on Climate Change, Agriculture and 
Food Security 
CIFOR The Centre for International Forestry Research 
CIMMYT Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de  Maíz y  Trigo  -  The 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre 
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement. 
CSA Climate smart agriculture 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
CoP Conference of the parties 
EPIC Economics and Policy Innovations for Climate-Smart Agriculture 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
GACSA Global alliance for climate smart agriculture 
IAASTD International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development 
ICRAF The World Agroforestry Centre (formerly International Centre for 
Research in Agroforestry) 
IFAD The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IRRI International Rice Research Institute 
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
LULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry 
MICCA Mitigation of Climate Change in Agriculture 
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
